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January 13, 2003 
Contingency n. pl. -cies 1: the quality or state of being contingent 2: a contingent 
event or condition as a: an event (as an emergency) that is of possible but uncertain 
occurrence < trying to provide for every ~ > b: something liable to happen as an 
adjunct to something else syn see JUNCTURE 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
  
History is just one goddamn thing after another. 
Brooks Adams
Before United States defense planners started using contingency as a synonym for "war other than World 
War III," the word had no particular strategic application. It has acquired one because, in the wake of the 
Soviet collapse, it captured the one-thing-after-another quality of the new security environment. For 
reasons that surpass understanding, people convinced themselves that the half century of world politics 
since the end of World War II—during which (to take but one measure of systemic chaos) the number of 
sovereign states on earth more than tripled—had in fact been a stately progress of bilateralism, in which 
every difficulty could be parsed as a variation on the theme of Great Power confrontation. Once that 
confrontation had ended, however, history kept happening. Only now events no longer seemed to be 
driven by a deeper, unifying logic that could give you some idea of what to expect. The world was 
suddenly full of contingencies—of things happening because of other things that happened—and the 
challenge became how to plan, budget, train, procure, and so on, in circumstances in which all problems 
seemed equally possible, and all scenarios equally uncertain. 
History Lessons 
The element of contingency in human affairs has long preoccupied historians, for a reason that may seem 
absurd: analytically, it is not easy to capture the fact that the past was once the future. When my students 
tell me that hindsight is twenty-twenty—a phenomenon that is, alas, seldom in evidence come exam 
time—they are seizing upon the only really distinctive feature of historical knowledge, and the one most 
obviously superior to what can be known by contemporaries: historians know what comes next. We know 
whose expectations will be vindicated by events, what an airplane will look like, which struggling artist will 
go on to achieve greatness. This sort of knowledge can cast a long shadow, and make it hard to see 
things as they appeared at the time. If you know about Hiroshima, it becomes harder to remember that in 
the spring of 1945 Allied planners expected the Second World War in Asia to require another eighteen 
months of hard fighting; which is why British and American leaders were so concerned to get the Soviet 
Union engaged against Japan; which is why, a few months later, Soviet troops had occupied Manchuria; 
which put them in a position to provide vital sanctuary to China's communist revolutionaries; from which 
sanctuary Mao's Red Army would go on to seize power in China; which regime would in turn save another 
fledgling communist state, in North Korea, from certain destruction at the hands of the United States. One 
goddamn thing after another. 
The reason this sort of stringing together of events and consequences never constitutes an adequate 
historical explanation is, first of all, because the historian's knowledge of consequences is rarely matched 
by a comparably precise knowledge of motives—that is, of the exact cognitive and emotional weight that 
various considerations possess for historical actors; secondly because other strings get twisted together 
with the one we care about, so that the original thread gets lost; and finally because, even when our 
knowledge of motives is reasonably sure, and all the exiguous knots have been untied, it is still necessary 
to identify and take into account the unspoken assumptions that shape people's actions without their 
being aware of it—this last being the practical embodiment of all those "forces" and "factors" that find 
expression in social theory. "Men make history," as Marx said, "but not as they please." For anyone 
seriously interested in the past, this is a big problem. 
One Thing and Another 
It is also a problem for anyone seriously interested in the present. The United States is today confronted 
with two looming crises, in Iraq and in North Korea, whose historical juncture cannot seriously be 
regarded as surprising, though it certainly is contingent in the strict dictionary sense of the word. During 
all the years when the prospect of "two mid-sized regional contingencies" provided the baseline for 
American defense planning, the two unnamed hot-spots lurking behind this bland abstraction were always 
the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. The 2MRC metric was eventually deemed too expensive, too 
improbable, too dismissive of other missions, too obstructive of defense "transformation," and was 
accordingly set aside in favor of more open-ended, "capabilities-based" planning, by which we figured out 
what we wanted to do, and put off worrying about where we would do it. Yet no one lost sight of Iraq and 
North Korea, which are, after all, on the very short list of places where enduring American interests are 
threatened by declared adversaries. When these two states ended up on opposite ends of the Axis of Evil, 
some people wondered about their connection to the terrorist attacks that had brought Evil to the top of 
the American agenda. Yet the fact that such familiar names had floated to the surface was also 
reassuring in a way, since it suggested that the world had not become altogether strange. 
The contingent nature of these quarrels nevertheless presents problems for the United States, to the 
extent that both have arisen as a consequence of the deliberate exercise of American power. One does 
not need to believe anything but the worst about both Iraq and North Korea to recognize that neither 
country would today be occupying the center of the world stage, were it not for the newly confrontational 
character of American foreign policy since the terrorist attacks of September, 2001. It is the United States 
that has chosen this moment to settle accounts with Iraq, based upon a declaratory policy of "preempting" 
threats from rogue states and WMD proliferators. That policy has in turn inspired North Korea to take the 
remarkable and dangerous step of publicly repudiating its earlier agreements respecting its nuclear 
weapons program. Pyongyang has expelled UN weapons inspectors from its territory, dismantled the 
associated monitoring equipment, and announced its intention to withdraw immediately from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, in violation of treaty provisions requiring three months notice before doing so. 
Although North Korean officials insist that their government has no interest in obtaining nuclear weapons, 
the claim is incredible on its face, and has been mooted by the equally startling claim of the United States 
that Pyongyang already possesses such weapons, so that the only thing now at stake is whether or not 
they have a few more. 
The contrast between America's refusal to give an inch over Iraq and the complacency of its response to 
North Korea's evidently more menacing nuclear program has rendered absurd the Bush administration's 
claim to be crafting a foreign policy based upon categorical norms of the with-us-or-against-us variety. 
Such talk was never realistic. The world is comprised overwhelmingly of states that are sometimes with 
us, rarely against us, often indifferent, but always disposed to remain the sole judge of their own interests. 
There is nothing the United States can do about this, and we can now expect to suffer our share of abuse 
for having sought to cast ourselves as more constant and principled than those we seek to lead. 
International acceptance of the necessity of war with Iraq has frayed somewhat in light of America's 
willingness to hold its fire toward Pyongyang, though probably not enough to affect our determination to 
proceed. On the other hand, commentators who have exhausted themselves cataloging the now obvious 
contradictions of U.S. policy might have spared a moment to welcome the return of pragmatism, 
multilateralism, and a sense of limits, which have no less obviously shaped the administration's response 
to the North Korean challenge. 
In strategic terms, moreover, the contradictions are more apparent than real, having to do entirely with the 
administration's self-presentation as the unflinching champion of the Light, rather than with its actual 
conduct. America is not deterred by Iraq, and is preparing to take the bull by the horns there precisely in 
order to avoid being deterred in the future. The main reason this hasn't been done already is because the 
administration wishes, within limits, to mollify the apprehensions of the rest of the world by acting on the 
basis of international consensus. In contrast, we are somewhat deterred by North Korea, which poses a 
lethal conventional threat to the population of South Korea, even without taking into account its nuclear 
arsenal. Whether that deterrent will suffice to hold off the United States indefinitely may be doubted; but it 
is obviously sufficient to rule out "preemptive" war, and to create an incentive for negotiation, to which the 
administration is now responding as quietly as possible. The difficulty with all this is not that it exposes 
American inconsistency, but that it exposes a consistency that is too painful to admit. Iraq is in the throes 
of trying to acquire the kind of military leverage that North Korea possesses, and the United States is 
determined to prevent that from happening because, as Pyongyang has now demonstrated, that sort of 
leverage is worth having. 
Looking Backward 
One thing historians of the future are likely to puzzle over when they consider our present moment is 
exactly how North Korean nukes come into it. They will, of course, know what comes next, and if that 
turns out the be nuclear war in Northeast Asia, the answer is going to seem a lot more obvious to them 
than it does to us. For now, North Korea does not claim to possess nuclear weapons. It is the Bush 
administration that makes the claim, which Pyongyang has declined to confirm, though one might imagine 
that, if their aim is to deter the United States, it would be in their interest to do so. As someone with a 
proven track record of flubbing questions about North Korean nuclear capability—I once got flustered and 
said on PBS that I couldn't answer the question, which the host just loved because it seemed like an 
admission that the nukes were there—it is, to say the least, interesting to see the Secretary of State go on 
Sunday morning television and talk about them as if they were no big deal. Doing so affords the political 
advantage of locating the roots of the present crisis in the Clinton administration, which is fair enough: the 
Bush team is not responsible for the North Korean nuclear program, which, whatever its current maturity, 
is certainly not new. But the present administration, which had determined to abandon its predecessor's 
more conciliatory policy even before 9/11, is responsible for the fact that that program is now being 
pursued on a crash basis, to the point where North Korea has taken the enormous gamble of abandoning 
its long-standing policy of surreptitious cheating, in the apparent hope of confronting the United States 
with a fait accompli while its energy and attention are tied up in Iraq. 
Exactly why Pyongyang would take such a risk is hard to say, and likely to remain so, motive being one of 
those problems that does not necessarily become easier to solve with the passage of time. My 
impression is that North Korea's conventional capability is and has long been sufficient to deter the United 
States from taking military action against it. Kim's government evidently disagrees, and has decided to roll 
the nuclear dice at what it takes to be an opportune moment. Whether it is doing this because it has 
developed realistic apprehensions about America's capacity to decapitate and overwhelm its decrepit 
military organization, or because it has been frightened by the Axis of Evil speech, or both (always a good 
choice for historians), may or may not be revealed in the future. 
For now, the United States is hoping that the prospect of a nuclear North Korea will galvanize other 
regional powers into weighing in on our side. On the other hand, if a nuclear North Korea is not a 
"prospect," but a settled fact, as we now claim, it is hard to see why this should motivate a change of 
policy in Beijing, Tokyo, or Seoul. The least that can be said in the imperfect light of the ever-vanishing 
present is that the North Korea crisis has revealed what might be called the moral limits of preemptive 
unilateralism: how far is the United States prepared to risk the lives of South Koreans in order to avert a 
more remote threat to our own population? This is a question to which we are not prepared to give a 
hasty answer—a reluctance whose merit deserves to be recognized regardless of what comes next. 
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